












         I recently asked ‘my 8 year old grand-daughter, Eliza,   whether she knew that all ponies are horses. ‘Of course,’ she said. 
     ‘What if I told you I know a man who doesn’t own a horse but does own a real live pony?’ She looked quizzically at me and decided not to take me seriously.  ‘No you don’t!’ she said.  Eliza’s reasoning, (E)    (i) All ponies are horses, so (ii) All owners of ponies are owners of horses is an example of deductive inference that children as well as adults commonly make.  
    I am now retired. When I taught college logic in the Sixties,   I would show the class that  (ii)  Every owner of a pony is an owner of a horse follows necessarily from  (i) Every pony is a horse.
            Using the symbolic mathematical language of modern predicate logic [MPL],   I would translate the premise, (i) Every pony is a horse as (1) For every thing, x,  if  x is a pony then x is a horse,  I would translate the conclusion, (ii)  Every owner of a pony is an owner of a horse’ as   (2) For every thing x,  for every thing  y, if  y is a pony and                  
 x owns y then there is a thing, z, such that  z is a horse and x owns z.  
 By applying  rules of  inference,  I had earlier  taught the class,  I would proceed stepwise to  carefully  derive  (2) from (1).    Not counting the time taken for translating into the quantifier/variable notation, the MPL proof that consisted of a chain of reasoning beginning with (1) and and ending with (2),  took  about seven minutes of class time.   That’s extremely slow compared to Eliza who moved from ‘every pony is a horse’ to ‘so every owner of a pony is an owner of a horse’ almost instantaneously.   Of course  Eliza  reasons intuitively, and when I taught logic in college in the Sixties,  I used  MPL to show what a formal derivation of  (ii) from (i) looks like.   
           It occurred to me even then that children must also be using some   methodical way to  derive (ii) from (i).   A popular Speaker of the U.S.  House of Representatives famously said ‘All Politics is local.’​[1]​  It is even more true that all Reasoning is formal.    Though she is altogether unaware of how she reasons,  Eliza  reasons formally. Her formal way of getting from (i)  to (ii) couldn’t be anything  like the formal process teachers of logic use to get from (i) to (ii).  For Eliza knows nothing  of  quantifiers or bound variables and she infers (ii) from (i) in less than a second, which can’t be done by reasoning in the manner of MPL.  When we reason intuitively there’s  time for no  more than one link in the “chain of reasoning” that derives (ii) from (i).  Since (E) is a valid inference, we have to assume that people who derive (ii) from (i)  in a split second,  are  unconsciously  using  some  logically legitimate  method in making that  inference.  What method could it be that enables us to derive (ii) from (i) intuitively?    
Logicians don’t know how children  reason and Eliza herself cannot tell us anything about how she reasons.    In the Meno, Plato famously asked how people, most of whom have never been taught how to reason, nevertheless reason correctly--- intuitively.  One can always depend on Plato, to ask intriguing questions. Unfortunately, he begs  this one by  arguing  that our ability to reason intuitively is  evidence that we must all have  been taught how to reason after all --- in an earlier incarnation before  we were born.    
§1.1       Back in the Sixties, I spent some weeks looking for a more acceptable answer.   I felt I could learn something very valuable if I could somehow figure out how people intuitively reason.  For the intuitive  method  that one  uses  to get from (i) to (ii) is not something recently invented by mathematically talented 19th Century logicians;  it  is a method we all  already  possess as evolved,  rational human beings.   Eliza’s method of reasoning naturally  is not generally known but it is clearly  more expeditious  than the slow pokey predicate logic  method I used to inflict on my logic classes. That method—the method of MPL – has only recently been discovered.    By contrast, Eliza’s  intuitive  and very rapid method of reasoning  couldn’t involve the use of a symbolic technical language that  takes an  average college student about week to learn.
       Piqued by the problem Plato raised in the  Meno,  I examined  many ordinary language arguments and  eventually hit on the method  we unconsciously use when reasoning intuitively.​[2]​
         Natural language, the language in which human beings normally reason,  is variable-free.  People don’t  reason in the ‘canonical’ quantifier-variable notation  of predicate logic taught in the universities.  When I presented the pony-owner/horse-owner  inference to my logic class,  it was immediately obvious to all the students that (i) entails (ii). Like Eliza, they derived (ii) from (i) instantly.    Nevertheless, they sat patiently sat for the seven minutes of  a formal proof that (ii) follows logically from (i).  They were in fact grateful to me for providing an explicit  chain of  technical unfamiliar  argumentation connecting (i) to (ii) that  officially proved that their  intuitive  “rush to judgment,”  was correct.  They  realized that “It’s obvious!” is not a proof;   they  knew that  they could never, by themselves, have produced any kind of  explicit proof that justified the validity of the inference they had  confidently but intuitively made.  
*******************************************
  §1.2          The moral of this little opening  discussion is that in our logic classes we do not teach anyone how to reason.   For, as Plato had observed, and as the example of Eliza and my students illustrates,   people  already  know how to reason --- intuitively.  That is to say,  people are able to reason,  even though they  are quite unaware of how they do it. 
Logicians too, do not know how  people naturally reason; few have  have the temerity to claim that we reason intuitively in the manner  prescribed  by modern predicate logic.   
      We  normally reason without being aware of how we reason.   For example,  we arrive  at the conclusion that  anyone who rides (owns, feeds, …) a pony, rides (owns, feeds, …) a horse from the premise that all ponies are horses without being aware of how we inferred that conclusion from that premise.  We confidently judge  that  two sentences  are logically equivalent (e.g.,  that ‘No ape is immortal’ and  ‘All apes are mortal’  “say the same thing, in other  words”) or that some discourse is inconsistent (e.g, that ‘some boy loves every  girl’  and ‘some girl is not loved by any boy’ can’t  be  jointly true). We produce a constant stream of  sound deductive judgments intuitively and instantly, without knowing  how we do it.  
        Despite our intuitive  “rush to judgment”,  our reasoning  is  usually valid.  We are rational animals after all.  We reason correctly most of the time. Teachers of logic are primarily engaged in proving the validity or invalidity of  deductive judgments,  naturally arrived at.  They are not concerned with how people intuitively reason.  They do not focus on the process of reasoning but on the product: is the inference valid or invalid, and if so how can we prove it?  Since the publication of  Gottlob Frege’s  logical writings and Whitehead and Russell’s Principia Mathematica,  the  ‘canonical’ way to prove or  disprove the validity of an inference is the way of Modern Predicate Logic (MPL).
                  The awkwardness of   reasoning in the “grammar” of MPL    
§1.3   The quantifier-variable  notation of MPL is, as Quine candidly calls it,   “an artificial grammar designed by logicians …that we tendentiously call standard,”  a  “made for logic”  grammar.​[3]​   Utilizing  the quantifier-variable notation of  predicate logic, modern logic constructs many proofs of validity  that  seem to be  beyond the deductive powers of  traditional (pre-Fregean) term logic, whose proofs, in “ordinary language” which is variable-free, do not deploy the quantifier/bound-variable mechanisms of MPL.  
         Quine  acknowledges that regimenting inferences in the symbolic language of predicate  logic is often irksome and  cumbersome.  But he  firmly maintains that it is  scientifically necessary:
All of austere science submits pliantly to the Procrustean bed of predicate logic.  Regimentation to fit it . . . serves not only to facilitate logical inference, but to  conceptual clarity. ​[4]​  
     The students in my logic class are typical examples of how, in the name of “austere science,”  we all quietly submit to  the Procrustean bed of predicate logic. Predicate logic does  offer a  scientific method of reasoning that facilitates Eliza’s inference.  But the  method of  reasoning it provides,  cannot explain how Eliza facilitates in a fraction of a second an inference that takes a teacher of MPL thousands of seconds to validate.  Before we agree that the method of predicate logic as the more ‘scientific’ one, we ought to find out how  Eliza  reasons so efficiently.
§1.4       Aristotle’s term logic which had been ‘standard logic’ for millennia, has in the course  of a single century  been  deposed  and thoroughly supplanted by Frege’s predicate logic.   Dummett calls  Frege’s “discovery of quantification, the deepest single technical advance  ever made in logic.”  p. xxxiii    It is now generally assumed that traditional (Aristotelian) term logic of natural language is  deductively weak, being incapable of accounting for the validity of arguments that involve  sentences with relational predicates like ‘loves’ or ‘owns’ that are  predicated of more than one general subject.  As  Michael Dummett says:
        Modern logic stands in contrast to all the great logical systems of        
the past… in being able to give an account of sentences … that
depends upon the mechanism of  quantifiers and bound variables. For all the subtlety of the earlier systems…modern logic is, by its capacity to handle multiple generality, shown to be far deeper than they were able to attain. ​[5]​(1993: xxxii).  
        Referring to Frege’s creation of predicate logic, with its grammar of quantifiers and bound variables, and its ability to deal with inferences involving relational, “multiply general”  sentences  Dummett  says, “Frege solved the problem which had baffled logicians for millennia by ignoring natural language.”​[6]​ 
      Though Dummett speaks of Frege’s “discovery of quantification,” it is not something one finds finds  in sentences of the natural language that  figures in our everyday reasoning.  It is  true that  natural language lacks the  elegant mechanism of quantifiers  and bound variables  that  facilitates logical proofs in MPL.  But it is also  true that  people, whose ‘language of thought’ is natural language,  make valid inferences involving all kinds of sentences and  modern philosophers of language should be baffled by our  ability to reason make such inferences intuitively.  The fact that we can reason intuitively in sentences of natural language is strong  prima facie evidence that the ability to reason  does not  “depend on the mechanism of quantifiers and bound variables.”  I have found that confining myself to  the language in which people normally  think  and reason --- does not condemn anyone  to methods of  reasoning that are deductively inferior to those afforded by the  symbolic  language of MPL.
        ‘Anyone who rides a pony, rides a horse’ is  a relational, multiply general sentence with predicates that have more  than one general subject.  What would Eliza tell us if she somehow  had articulate, conscious access to the way  she derives  this sentence  from  the premise, ‘All ponies are horses’?   How would she  explain why she  is  so confident that it “follows from”  that premise?  How would her account of how she naturally reasons,  explain  the ease, fluency and sheer speed of her reasoning?  Above all how would her  account explain  why she  reasons correctly much more often than not?​[7]​
           
  §2       If we go back to a preFregean era when logicians regarded Logic as a ‘Laws of Thought,’  the science of how we intuitively reason in the natural language we use in everyday reasoning,  we find Thomas Hobbes dogmatically and enigmatically  announcing that  we mentally reason  in an algebraic manner: “By the ratiocination of our mind, we add and subtract in our silent thoughts, without the use of words.”​[8]​   Historians of logic say  that  Hobbes thought of reasoning  as “a species of computation” but they point out that “his writing contain in fact no attempt to work out such a project.” ​[9]​ 
        Later in the 17th century, Leibniz strongly endorsed Hobbes’s  characterization of our silent ratiocination:  
	Thomas Hobbes, everywhere a profound examiner of principles,    rightly stated that everything done by our mind is a computation by which is to be understood either the addition of a sum or the subtraction of a difference. So just as there are two primary signs of algebra and analytics, + and –, in the same way there are, as it were, two copulas. ​[10]​
            Though Leibniz alludes to the plus/minus character of the positive and negative copulas, neither  he nor Hobbes say anything about a plus/minus character of  other common logical words that mentally drive our intuitive, everyday deductive judgments --- words like  ‘some’, ‘all’, ‘if’, ‘then’ and ‘and’,  each of which, as  I  discovered in my efforts to answer Plato’s Meno question,   also have a positive or negative character that  allows us, “in our silent thoughts” to reckon with it as one reckons with a plus or a minus operator in elementary algebra or arithmetic.​[11]​   
        Hobbes was actually  right about the additive and subtractive nature of intuitive  reasoning,  but he did not go into details.  In particular, he did not  focus attention on the diverse  ‘logical constants’ of natural language  --- specifying which are the positive ones we reason with as “plus-words” and which  the negative ones  we reason with as  “minus-words.”  As a  result,  his  insight  into the +/-  character of everyday ‘ratiocinations’ had little effect on the future development of logic.   
                                      The Logical and the Extra-logical
§2.1         Why, Plato had asked,   are  uneducated  children or slaves  able to reason logically?  This question focused  my attention  on  the natural ‘logical constants’ that drive inference in  intuitive reasoning,  logical words and particles and particles  such as ‘is,’ ‘isn’t,’ ‘not,’ ‘non-,’  ‘all,’ ‘if,’ and ‘and’  that figure so prominently in everyday reasoning.    
          Scholastic logic sharply distinguishes  between formative, logical, elements  of a sentence and its material  extra-logical elements.  The material elements are the “categorematic” words that semantically relate the sentence to things in the world. For example, in the sentence ‘Not every dog is friendly’ the terms  ‘dog’  and ‘friendly’ are the material elements;  these words carry its  matter or content.  The formative elements of the sentence are “syncategorematic”  words that determine the logical form of the sentence. The logical  form  of  ‘Not every dog is friendly’  is ‘Not every X is Y’  whose formative  elements are  the words  ‘Not,’ ‘Every,’ and ‘Is.’   (The letters ‘X’ and ‘Y’ mark the place where the terms go.)  
        Hoping to learn how we  reason intuitively,  I spent several weeks looking at the way the various logical formatives are facilitating everyday  reasoning.  At first I confined my efforts to syllogistic reasoning but eventually I  discovered an algorithm that applies generally to all kinds of reasoning  that reckons  with the logical formatives of natural language as one  reckons  with the  plus  and minus  operators in elementary algebra.  
                 I found,  for example,  that  ‘is,’ ‘and’,  ‘some,’ and ‘then,’ are  “PLUS-WORDS”  but  that ‘isn’t,’ ‘not,’ ’all,’ and ‘if,’   are  “MINUS-WORDS.”   In 1967 I became convinced  that we normally reason intuitively  by unconsciously exploiting  the +/- character of the  logical formatives of   natural language,   reckoning with its  plus words  and  its minus words   as quickly and as easily as one reckons with the plus and minus signs of simple expressions  in elementary algebra or arithmetic.  
          Plato rightly  believed that all rational beings  innately possess  some  rudiments of  algebraic knowledge,  so that when a seven year old child is told that x+y = y+x,  it greets that  truism  as one greets  a friend or familiar acquaintance – something  it is not meeting for the first time.  I think he is right about that. Today we would accept that as an example of how we are genetically endowed with some algebraic and geometric know-how  that has  given us an enormous advantage over lesser animals.   By the time I was teasing Eliza  about pony owners and horse owners I had long convinced that she reasons intuitively by  reckoning with  the +/-  character of  the logical formatives of natural language in very much the way she  reckons with the  pluses and minuses in arithmetic or beginners algebra.   Unconsciously Eliza  regards ‘and,’  ‘is,’ and  ‘some’ as plus-words  and ‘all,’ ‘isnt ,’ and ‘not’ as minus-words.   Knowing that +x+y = +y+x,  she can  instantly “see” that  ‘Some{+} Teachers are{+} Men’ says the same thing as ‘Some{+} Men are{+} Teachers,’   
         Discursively: ‘Some{+} Teachers are{+} Men’  ≡ Some{+} Men are{+}Teachers 
                                                                                                                
“Logibraically”:      +         Teachers +  Men    =      +     Men   +   Teachers

        She  also reasons that being a Boy and{+}a Red–head’  is the same as being  a Red-head and{+} a Boy:   
<Boy and{+} Red-head> =   <Red-head and{+} Boy>
<B+R>  =  <R+B>
     
      
          I once overheard a father warning his nine year old son, Timmie, not to pet an approaching strange  dog, sayiing:
                            Not{-}: All{-} Dogs are{+}Friendly, Timmie.
 
     Timmie immediately transformed his father’s  sentence into its logically equivalent obverse, responding: 
                        Some{+} dogs, aren’t{-} friendly, don’t you think I know that, Dad! 

We can explain Timmie’s rational fluency if we assume that he unconsciously reasoned the +/- way, instinctively reckoning  the formatives ‘not,’ ‘all,’ and ‘aren’t’ as minus words while reckoning the formatives  ‘some’ and ‘are’ as plus words:                  
              Not{-} All{-} Dogs are{+}Friendly     Some{+}Dogs aren’t{-} friendly                    
                                                                                           
                  -     ( -    Dogs   +  Friendly)    =         +     Dogs      –     Friendly

                  
                 Reasoning “logibraically” with  relational sentences 

§3.1 Being aware that  distributing the external minus sign of  ‘-(-a+h+t)’ inward,  changes  the
internal signs,   a teenager will  immediately recognize that it  is equal to ‘+a+(-h)-t’.    Teenagers are just as quick to see that the discursively meaningful, ‘multiply general,’   sentence ‘Not: every archer  had hit  some target’ is logically equivalent to  ‘Some archer had missed  every target’; here  we find  the teenager unconsciously reckoning with discursively  meaningful sentences   as he reckons with discursively  meaningless  algebraic expressions,  distributing the external “minus-word” ‘not{-}’ to the right  as if it were a minus-sign prefixing an algebraic expression. In this case the teenager the minus-word ‘not’  changes ‘every{-} archer’ to ‘some{+} archer,’  ‘hit{+},’  to its logical contrary,  ‘hit{-}’ and ‘some {+}target’ to ‘every{-} target: 
Not{-}: Every{-}  archer had{+}  hit some{+}  target     ≡    some{+} archer had{+}+ missed every{-} target            
                                                                                                                          
   -    (    -            archer   +    (+hit)  +       target))    =          +       archer    +      (-hit)        -    target)

    In transforming ‘not  every archer  had hit a target’ to ‘some  archer  had missed every target’ we reason in  just the way we reason in elementary algebra when transforming ‘-(-a+h+t)’  to
 ‘+a+(-h)-t’.  The difference between the two moves is  that  when  people reason  with logical words like ’not’, ‘every’,  ‘some’ and ‘is’ or with logical contraries like ‘hit’ and ‘missed’,   they are completely unaware  that  they are reasoning “logibraically,”  in this case, distributing  a negative particle like  ‘not{-}’ to the right,  thereby  changing  all the  positively and negatively  charged particles in its scope to their logibraic  opposites.
         I  eventually came to believe that we  reason intuitively by instinctively (unconsciously) exploiting the additive and subtractive powers of the logical words of  the natural language in which we think.   In my opinion, that is what accounts for speed and fluency  of our daily reasoning.   Hobbes had somehow divined this.  I had read the Leviathan and must have read his peremptory pronouncements on how we reason, but had forgotten them.  (Or perhaps I should I say, I was  not conscious of the impression they had made on me.)  
        Two possible  +/- accounts of ‘Ponies are Horses, so Pony-owners are Horse-owners’
      §3.2     This is the kind of inference that had “baffled logicians for millennia” before Frege showed us a way to handle them by “ignoring natural language.” Since people reason in natural language,  the question to ask is: How might we instinctively be taking advantage of   the +/- powers of the natural constants of natural language to infer  ‘So every{-} owner of a{+} pony is{+} an owner of a{+} horse’ from ‘Every{-} pony is{+}  a horse?’ 
  One way we could  validate that inference is by regarding it as an enthymeme whose missing  premise, is the tautology, ‘Every owner of a horse is an owner a horse.’  We can then derive ‘Every{-} owner of a{+} pony is{+} an owner of a{+} horse’  from the following conjunction: 
(1)Every{-}Pony is{+}a Horse and{+}(2)Every{-}Owner of a{+}Horse is{+}an Owner of a{+}Horse:
Adding  (2) to (1) we get , ‘Every{-}Owner of a{+} Pony is{+} an Owner of a{+} Horse:’                    
                                        
     [ -Pony+Horse] +  [-(Owner of  +Horse) + (Owner of +Horse)]   =>   -(Owner +Pony)+(Owner of +Horse)

1. Zoological Premise:                Every{-} Pony is{+} a Horse
2. Tautological Premise:  and+  Every{-}Owner of a{+} Horse is{+} an Owner of a{+} Horse 
3. Conclusion:                             Every{-}Owner of a{+} Pony is{+} an Owner of  a{+}  Horse.
 	 A second way is by reasoning indirectly,   arguing that it can’t possibly be true  that some owner of a pony  isn’t an owner of an horse animal.  For we should then have:   
(i) Every{-} pony is+ a horse{+} and{+} (ii) Some{+} owner of a{+} pony doesn’t{-} own a{+} horse.
From these two premises, it would follow that
(iii)  Some{+} owner of an{+} horse isn’t{-}an owner of an{+}  horse:
Logibraically:              (i)  -P+H  +  (ii) +(O+P) -(O+H)]  =>   (iii) +(O+H) – (O+H)
                                                                        (i)      -P+H
           +(ii)   +(O+P) -  (O+H)
                                                                    (iii) +(O+H) – (O+H)

We know that (i) is true.  If (ii) were also true, (iii), an absurd conclusion, would follow.  To avoid  that reductio  one must deny (ii).  But the negation  of (ii) is 
is ‘–[+(O+P) -(O+H)]’ or ‘-(O+P)+(O+H):’  
-(O+P)+(O+H)     Every owner of a pony is an owner of a horse.
   Eliza  possesses the resources to use either one  of these two ways to get from ‘all ponies are horses’ to ‘All pony owners are horse owners.’ 
         Plato believed  that we reason intuitively  because we have been taught logic in a previous incarnation.  There is a more acceptable, modern, explanation for our ability to reason  that does not beg the question he had originally raised. 
 We are rational  social  animals whose  ancestors had  naturally evolved to the point of  possessing the ability to communicate in a descriptive language and to reason in that language.   In a Pickwickian sense we are  “reincarnations” of the myriads of increasingly sapient primates from whom we are descended,  including those ancestors who  acquired some rudimentary algebraic know-how and the advantageous ability to use natural language  not only to describe but also  to  reason --- --- by instinctively exploiting the plus/minus character of its logical formatives. 
Term Logic and Propositional Logic
§4.   Logic, the science of reasoning, distinguishes  two main  branches.    Aristotle’s logic of terms preceded the Stoic’s  logic of propositions by some two hundred years.  In Aristotle’s day and for more than two thousand years thereafter, term logic was ‘primary logic.’ Indeed Leibniz looked for a way to incorporate propositional logic as a special branch of term logic:
	If as I hope, I can conceive all propositions as terms, and hypotheticals as categoricals, 	and if I can treat all propositions universally, this promises a wonderful ease in my 	symbolism and . .  will be a discovery of the greatest importance.  
         Until  the advent of modern predicate logic as inaugurated by  the Gottlob Frege in 1879 and codified in Whitehead’s and Russell’s Principia Mathematica (1905),  Aristotle’s logic of Terms was ‘primary logic’  and the Stoic logic of propositions was secondary.  After Frege and the Principia, the primacy was reversed.  As the Kneales  say of the  Stoics:
The logic of propositions which they studied is more fundamental than the logic of general terms which Aristotle studied in the sense that … it is presupposed by the second [which] is primary because it must come at the beginning of any systematic development.  If we adopt this practice, we reserve the title, ‘general logic’ for the study in which we are concerned not only with the notions of negation, conjunction, disjunction and disjunction  but also with the notions of  generality expressed by ‘every’ and ‘some.  General logic, so defined,  includes primary logic… and cannot be developed without it… Within this scheme Aristotle’s syllogistic  takes its place as a fragment of general logic, in which theorems of primary logic are assumed.  
§4.1  In a general logic that includes both the logic of terms and the logic of, neither logic  is primary.  Leibniz’s ideal of a unified symbolism for the logic of terms and the logic of propositions is achieved the moment we recognize  the +/-  character  of all the logical constants of natural language,  whether  they be propositional connectives like ‘if{-} … then{+}’ and ‘both{+}…and{+}’  or term connectives like ‘every{-}… is{+}’ and ‘some{+} …is{+}.’​[12]​  
                  Some natural constants belong both to the logic of terms and to the logic of  propositions.  ‘And’ conjoins terms (‘gentleman and scholar’)  as well as propositions. ‘Not’ has both term and propositional scope  (‘not happy’, ‘un-happy;’ ‘Not: a creature was stirring’).  ‘And’ is  literally additive and  plus-like.  ‘Not’ is literally subtractive and minus-like.  Formatives like ‘every’ and ‘some’,  ‘if,’ and ‘then’ don’t strike us as being  minus-like or plus-like.  Nevertheless they too behave like plus or minus operators.  
      
How to  determine the plus/minus character of the natural logical constants
 §5.       Consider the propositional conjunction ‘both p and q’.   Intuitively, the logical words ‘and’ and ‘both’ behave in a plus-like way. Their logibraic, plus-like character is evident in the commutative character of the conjunction ‘both p and q’, where ‘both’ as well as ‘and’  behaves like the two plus signs in the algebraic expression ‘+x+y’.
		
                        Both p and  q		Both q and p
		                                          
                            + p     +     q	=	    +  q   +   p
                
     The equivalence shows that ‘both,’ like ‘and,’  is a “plus-word” .     
  Having determined this,  we may logibraically” transcribe ‘Not: both p and not-q’ as 
–(+p+(–q)).
Not: both p and not-q
                                                                           
 –     (  + p    + (  – q))
         Now consider the propositional connective ‘if...then’.   Neither ‘if’ nor ‘then’ strikes us as plus-like or minus-like.  However, we know that ‘If p then q’ can be defined as ‘Not: both p and not-q,’ which transcribes as  ‘–(+p+(–q)).’  We may therefore determine the +/- character of ‘If ..then’ by setting  ‘If{?} p then{?} q’ equal to ‘Not{-}(both{+} p and not{-}q)’ and seeing what that tells us about the positive or negative character of ‘if’ and ‘then’ :
            	If? p then? q	=def. Not-: both{+} p  and{+}   not{-}q
		        		                                   
  		 –  p   +  q	=def.	  –  (   + p           +           ( – q)  )
Expressed logibraically, the definitional equivalence shows that ‘if’ is a minus-word and ‘then’ is a plus-word:
If{-} p then{+} q  =def.   Not{-}: both{+} p  and{+}   not{-}q
 The +/- character of ‘if’’ and ‘then’ is manifest in “contraposition”: 
       if p then q   =   if not-q then not p   
                                             
        - p   +     q   =    -  (-  q)   +    (-p)     
	
Note the difference between representing the logical equivalence of ‘if p then q’ to ‘Not: both p and not-q’ conventionally as  ‘p  q  ~(p&~q),’ and representing it “logibraically” as ‘ –p+q  =  –(+p+(–q)).’  One proves that  ‘pq’ and ‘~(p&~q)’ are logically equivalent by truth tables. Represented  as ‘ –p+q  =  –(+p+(–q)),’ no proof is needed;  the equivalence is perspicuous as an algebraic truism.
	Among the basic inference patterns in standard propositional logic are the principles knows as modus ponens, modus tollens and hypothetical syllogism. All three principles are perspicuous in the logibraic  notation:
	Modus Ponens		Modus Tollens	Hypothetical Syllogism
		     –p+q			–p+q			 –p+q
		       p		                         –q		            –q+r    	         
          	                  q		        –p		         –p+r


     Determining  the plus/minus character of  the formatives in the logic of terms 
                   
§5.1           The natural formatives ‘is,’ ‘isn’t,’  ‘some,’ and ‘every’ drive inference in the logic of terms.  We think of the positive copula ‘is’ as a plus-word and of the negative copula ‘isn’t’ as a minus-word.  Although we  do not  think of  ‘some,’  and ‘every,’ as plus-like or minus-like, they too have a plus or minus character.  How can one show that they too are +/- formatives? 
         Starting with ‘is’ and  ‘and’ as  plus-words and with ‘not’ as a minus-word, we  can determine the +/- character of  ‘some’ and ‘all.’​[13]​  
                                          That ‘some’ is a plus-word
              The commutative equivalence of  ‘some{?} A is{+} B’  to ‘some{?} B is{+} A’ shows  that ‘some A is B’ is to ‘some B is A’ as ‘+A+B’ is to ‘+B+A’: 
                                  Some{?} A is{+} B           Some{?} B  is{+}  A                                     
                                                                                       
                                         +      A  +    B        =     +         B   +    A.
The parallel equivalences reveal that ‘some’  is a plus-word.                                                                  
                                          That ‘all’ is a minus-word
      Here is what Aristotle says of propositions that begin with ‘every’ or ‘all’:  “We say that one term is predicated of all of another, whenever no instance of the subject can be found of which the other term cannot be asserted.” (24b 29-30)
         Aristotle’s treatment of  ‘All M are P’  as the denial of ‘Some M are not-P,’ is  analogous to the way modern logicians define ‘if p then q’  as the denial of ‘both p and not q’.            
        Having  fixed the  +/- character  of  ‘are,’ ‘some,’ and ‘not;’ we may proceed to  determine  the plus/minus character of ‘all’:
                All{?} M  are{+}P          def.   Not{‒}: some{+}M   is  not{‒}P
                                                                                                                                           
                  ‒      M   +      P           def.        ‒      ( +       M   +     (-P))​[14]​ 
           The  “logibraic” equivalence shows that ‘all’ is a minus-word.  
        The minus-character of ‘all’  is exemplified in  BARBARA syllogisms and other common inferences: 
Barbara:
\             All{-}M are{+}P  and{+} All{-} S are{+} M,  hence    All{-}S are{+} P 
                                                                                                    
                   [-M+P]        +              [-S+M]              =>                 -S  +  P
    
   Obverse equivalence:  
                                 Not{-}: all{-} M is{+}P   =   Some{+}M isn’t{-}  P
                                             -(-M +P)          =             +M-P     
 
It is in this fashion that one specifies the plus/minus character of the syncategorematic  elements that drive deductive reasoning which it observes  in play in everyday reasoning . 

§6.         The following  is a very partial but representative list of natural language formatives  that figure in our everyday intuitive reasoning:
‘some’(‘a’..), ‘is’ (‘was,’ ‘will be,’ etc.), ‘both,’ ‘and’, and ‘then’ are “plus- words;”
‘Every,’(‘all,’’any’..),’not,’ (‘no,’ ‘ain’t,’ ‘un-,’ etc.), and ‘if’ are “minus-Words.”

     Russell somewhere says that a good notation is like a live teacher. Here are three sample lessons that  the +/- notation teaches about the logical constants of natural language:
       I.   Consider the categorical forms ‘Some S is P,’  All S is P,’ and ‘No S is P.’   Unlike ‘some’ and ‘all,’ which are words of ‘quantity,’ ‘no’ is not a word of quantity (in the sense that zero is a number).  ‘No’ is  a denial of propositional  scope whose meaning is  ‘it is not the case that.’  Logibraically, the ‘No’ of ‘No- S is+ P’ denies a proposition that follows it.   We transcribe ‘no{-} S is{+} P’  as ‘-(S+P),’ an abbreviated form of ‘-(+S+P)’ [ not{-}: some{+S  is{+} P].   

      II.   Why  ‘Or, ’ does  not appear on the list of primitive  plus/minus words.  
 Unlike  ‘and’  and ‘if,’ ‘or’  is neither a plus-word nor a minus word but a composite of two minus words.  Logibraically, ‘p or q’ is ‘p, if{-} not{-}q.’  If  English had a contraction for  ‘if  not,’ ‘or’ would literally have the meaning ‘ifn’t.’   ‘‘p or  q’  logibraically transcribes as ‘p –(-q),’  ‘Or’ not like other  composites such as ‘isn’t’ and ‘won’t,’  which, being contractions of  ‘+, -’  can be safely be transcribed as minus words. Because ‘Or’  is a logical “diphthong” that  irreducibly transcribes as  ‘– -’  it belies the saying that “ two negatives always make a positive.”
    p or q  =def.   p if{-} not{-}q      p  – (-q).

III.  Self-contradictory propositions  of form ‘Some X isn’t X’   and ‘p and not-p’  give zero information about the world. This is  perspicuous in the forms ‘+X-X’ and ‘p+(-p).’  The same is true of tautological propositions.  ‘Every- X is+ X’   and ‘if- p then+ p also give zero information about the world:  ‘-X+X =0;   -p+p = 0.  Contradictions “say nothing” falsely. Tautologies also say nothing but say it truly.
      This is true not only of simple tautologies like ‘if p then p’ but also of interesting tautologies.  Quite generally the empirical  information content of  logical truths is literally zero. They say nothing about how the world is.   Consider  the tautological  truth ‘if no horse is inorganic then anyone who rides a horse, rides something organic:’    -[-(H+(-O))]  + [-(R + H ) +(R +  O )].
Being logibraically equal to zero, it is empirically uninformative.  
§7.          Having educed the +/- character of the logical  constants of natural language,  I soon came to believe that we instinctively  reason  with them by unconsciously  regarding them as being positively or negatively “charged.”   For example, we  read  ‘some’ as ‘some{+}’, ‘all’ as ‘all{-}’, ‘if’ as ‘if{-}’, ‘then’ as ‘then{+}’, ‘and’ as   and,{+} ‘is’ as ‘is{+}’  and reckon with them accordingly.
 Admittedly, it is more than a little odd that we should constantly  be reasoning  by  exploiting  the   +/- character of  familiar logical words like ‘all’, ‘some’, ‘is’, ‘not’, and ‘if’   without  becoming consciously aware of their +/- character.   That we instinctively exploit the +/- character of  the natural constants of natural language in our ‘ratiocinations’  is an empirical hypothesis.  I expect that cognitive science, and more specifically, cognitive psychology, will  eventually find ways to  test  this hypothesis and to confirm or disconfirm it.   I am convinced that  the hypothesis  will not be falsified;  it  is  the most reasonable explanation of our rational celerity, of  why we are mentally as adept at reasoning with the logical constants of natural language as we are adept at reckoning with the plus and minus operators of elementary algebra and arithmetic.  
        Ratiocination is something that takes place in real time (in this case milliseconds) in real minds (including children’s) that  reason  competently with sentences of  natural language. We may innately  only have some rudiments of algebraic know-how but  what innate knowledge we  possess,  enables us to reason logibraically even with relational  sentences of natural language.   Originally an inspired conjecture of Thomas Hobbes, the  hypothesis that intuitive   reasoning is an  unconscious  process of logibraic reckoning will,  I  predict, eventually  come to be accepted as a psychological reality.   
             Of course cognitive scientists won’t enter the picture to arrive at an empirical judgment, before they learn that the logical constants of  natural language  have  a +/- character.  They won’t be learning  that from philosophers of language or academic logicians.  Despite repeated efforts on my part to attract  attention  to the +/- character of the natural language constants, I must report that I have failed to interest philosophers and logicians in the minus-like   behavior of natural  logical  constants such as ‘if,’  ‘every,’ and ‘not,’ or the plus-like behavior of  ‘then,’ ‘some,’ ‘and,’ and ‘is.’   
         Impressed by Frege’s concept-script, modern logicians and some linguists  assume that  a child who reasons that  every pony is a horse so every rider of a pony  is a  rider of a horse’  or  a teenager who says ‘If some boy is taller than every girl, then every girl is shorter than some boy,’ must somehow be reasoning with sentences that have the  mechanisms of the  made-for-logical-grammar  of MPL.  (As if human beings have evolved to think and  reason in the Procrustean bed of predicate logic  to reason with in  formulas  of a constructionist  notation devised by a brilliant  19th  century  mathematical logician.) 
          I have shown that the logical words of  natural language have a +/- character. That
we actually reason by exploiting the +/- character of the natural formatives has not (yet) been shown.  I expect that cognitive will  find that to be so. In any case it is an intriguingly simple  hypothesis and friends of MPL should have taken the +/- theses  seriously and  presented arguments against them.  So far they have  evinced  very little interest in my formal thesis that the natural constants are oppositively charged and no interest  at all in the empirical psychological  hypothesis that  we exploit  their charged +/- character in actual reasoning.  
Both theses have inappropriately been met, not with critical appraisal but with an obdurate silence.  I published the first article on the formal  thesis more than forty years ago​[15]​  and subsequently wrote a book called ‘The Logic of Natural Language.’  That the logical formatives can be reckoned with “logibraically” is a surprising feature of natural language. That we actually reason logibraically is, if true, an important facet  of our rational nature.  Neither thesis has generated a single serious critical article in the literature.  
      No acceptable  account of human reasoning  can  afford to make light of the fact that we think and reason in sentences of  natural language.  One of  the main objectives of a course in logic  is  to clarify formally  what is intuitively obvious.   Most students find it obvious that ‘some boy loves every girl entails ‘every girl is loved by some boy.’  A course in logic  should explain why the student finds that obvious. Ideally, the  teacher should present a formal proof of the inference  that elicits  an “Aha!” reaction.  “Aha, so that’s how we actually reckon with these sentences!   That’s  why I intuitively arrived  so quickly and confidently to this  very conclusion!”   
         No student of logic presented  with an MPL proof that  ‘Not: every archer  had hit some target’ logically entails  ‘Some archer had missed  every target’  will ever react to the conventional  proof by saying: ‘So that’s why I find it so obvious that ‘Some archer had missed  every target’ follows from ‘Not: every archer  had hit some target’.  No student in my logic class reacting  to my MPL proof  that ‘every pony is a horse’ entails ‘every owner of a pony  is an owner of a  horse’ ever said ‘Aha! So that’s why I find this inference so obvious.’     When I changed my conventional MPL  way of teaching logic to the +/- way, I was rewarded by many an ‘Aha!’ reaction to the /-  accounts of  these and other obvious  inferences.  
           On  how the modern orthodoxy  overrides scientific common sense
§8.	The orthodox view that quantifiers binding variables facilitates actual inference has even been embraced by linguists who are expressly in the business of explaining linguistic and logical competence. Noam Chomsky is rightly famous for his insistence on empirical explanations for the extraordinary linguistic competence of native speakers, including their competent use of natural language to reason deductively. However, Chomsky is all too aware that traditional term logic (TTL), which adhered closely to the quantifier-free and variable-free syntax of natural language, found it difficult to justify the validity of inferences involving multiple generality.  Augustus De Morgan’s example ‘Every horse is an animal, so every tail of a horse is a tail of an animal’ raised serious doubts about the ability of TTL to formally derive conclusions of form ‘Every R to an X is R to a Y’ from premises of form ‘Every X is Y’.  By contrast, modern predicate logic (MPL) with its quantifier/variable notation, could elegantly explain why ‘Every R to an X is R to a Y’ follows from ‘Every X is Y’ and many similar inferences whose validity traditional logic could not explain. Impressed by the superior  inference power of modern predicate logic, Chomsky seems ready to abandon the search for an empirical explanation that would shed light on our linguistic competence in reasoning with the variable-free sentences of natural languages and to accept the orthodox logicians’ view that the sentences we use in such deductive inferences have a quantifier/variable syntax. We find him suggesting that the sentences that figure in our everyday reasoning may not be what they appear to be: “The familiar quantifier/variable notation should in some sense be more natural for humans than a variable-free notation for logic”​[16]​At one point he even says that “[t]here is some empirical evidence that it [the brain] uses quantifier/variable rather than quantifier-free notation.”​[17]​
	In the present, early, stage of its development , brain research is nowhere near the point of being able to specifying the syntax of sentences that figure in our deductive judgments. There can be no empirical evidence from brain science that we are using quantifier/variable notation. Nor is there any empirical basis for Chomsky’s astonishing suggestion that quantifier/bound variable syntax is ‘more natural for humans’ than a variable-free syntax. That suggestion, like the one about the brain using a quantifier/variable notation, merely attests to Chomsky’s uncharacteristically unquestioning acceptance  of a widely accepted conventional modern doctrine, in this instance, of  the doctrine  that many of  sentences we reason with,  are essentially quantifier/variable in form—an all too typical example of doctrinal  “scientific” orthodoxy dogmatically overriding one’s scientific common sense.
	Uncritical faith in  formal technical advances made by Frege and codified in  Principia Mathematica and  in textbooks of logic such as Quine’s Methods of Logic,  has led many contemporary philosophers and is sorely tempting some  linguists to abandon the fundamental research program into the question that goes back to Plato’s Meno and that today is  properly beginning to engage empirically-minded linguists and cognitive psychologists: ‘How do people reason intuitively in their native languages?’
                                Aristotle’s  Logic of Natural Language   
 §9.  The +/- logic is a ‘Logic of  Natural Language’ because it focuses our attention on the logical formatives of natural language and shows how we  can be reckon with them as we reckon with the plus/minus operators in elementary algebra.   It is an Aristotelian logic because, the Dictum de Omni --- the governing principle of inference in  Aristotelian Logic---  sanctions the +/- way of making inferences in natural language.
         According to the Dictum de Omni:
What’s true of every{-} M is true of whatever is{+} an M.
By the D.O., when  is said to be true every{-} M in one premise and ‘is{+} an M’  is said to be true of something   in a second premise,  the ‘middle  term,’ M  occurs negatively in the first  premise, where it is said to “distributed,”  and  positively in the second premise, where it is said to be “undistributed.”    When we add the first premise to the second, the negative middle term logibraically cancels the positive middle  term of the second premise,  replacing it by   in a conclusion in which no middle terms appear: 
 
{}(-M)
 … +M        
                                                                         …  

For example:        i.                                                           ii.
 All{-}Mammals are{+} Warm-blooded           All{-}Mammals are{+} Warm-blooded                     
 All{-}Dolphins are{+} Mammals                      Some{+}  Sea Creatures are{+}Mammals           
All{-}Dolphins are{+}Warm-blooded           Some{+}Sea Creatures are{+}Warm-blooded  

              -M+W                                                                   -M+W                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           …          -D+M                                                                    +S+M .
          -D+W                                                                +S+W
§10.                The  logibraic  form of categorical sentences
           In today’s standard logic, sentences of form ‘every/some A is B’ are regimented as ‘x(Ax⊃Bx)  and ‘x(AxBx).’ 
 In  traditional logic, a  categorical sentence affirms or denies that some/every A/non-A is/isn’t B/non-B:
Yes/ Not:  Some/Every A/non-A  is/isn’t B/non-B
+/-              (  +/-         A/-A           +/-          B/-B)

          Every categorical  sentence has a positive or negative ‘valence.’ 
          The valence of a sentence is  positive or ‘postively existential’  when its sign of judgment, ‘Yes{+}/Not{–},’   is the same as its sign of quantity [Some{+}/Every{-}]  i.e.,   when both signs are pluses [Yes{+}(Some{+}…] or  when both are minuses. [Not{-}(Every{-}…].  Sentences whose valence is positive are existentially positive and are said to be ‘particular in  quantity.’
       The valence of a sentence is negative or ‘negatively existential’  when  its judgment sign and quantity sign differ as in   ‘Yes{+} (Every{-}…-‘  or  ‘No(t){-}(Some{+}….’ A sentence that is  negative  in valence, is said to be existentially negative and to  have  ‘universal quantity.’

Two sentences of the same valence are ‘covalent.’ Sentences that differ in valence are ‘divalent.’ Divalent sentences differ in quantity, one being “particular’ and existentially positive,  the other being “universal” and existentially negative. Covalence  is  a necessary condition of logical equivalence. Divalent sentences that are algebraically equal are not logibraically equal.  For example,  being divalent,  ‘some mammals aren’t whales’ [+M-W] and  ‘all whales are mammals’[-W+M] are not ‘logibraically equal.’
         THE  LOGIBRAIC CONDITIONS FOR EQUIVALENCE:
Categorical propositions are logically equivalent if
 and only if
they are both algebraically equal and covalent.

Some conventions of logibraic notation
§10.1   Here  are several examples of categorical sentences transcribed in  +/-  notation.
(1) Not a creature was stirring    →    -(+C+S)
    (2) Not every dog is friendly        →    -(-D+F)
(3) Some bats weren’t moving     →      +(+B-M ) 
(4) Every creature was moving    →     +(-C+M) 

Since an affirmative  statement such as  (3) or (4) is only rarely  prefixed by  an explicit  phrase such as ‘it is the case that,’  or ‘Yes’,  we do not normally transcribe them  with a sign of affirmative judgment.   Thus (3) may simply be transcribed as ‘+B-M’ and (4) as ‘-C+M’. However in determining their valence we assume they are tacitly prefixed by  plus- signs of affirmation.
The     valence of (2) and (3) is positive. The valence of (1) and (4) is negative.  
  (1) is logically equivalent to 
           -C-S,        [every creature wasn’t stirring]
           -C+(-S)     [every creature was not-stirring]
           -(C+S)      [no creature was stirring]

(3)           +B-M          [some bats weren’t moving]    is logically equivalent to 
            -(-B +M)         [not every bat was moving]
            +B+(-M)         [some bats were  motionless]
            -(M+B)            [nothing moving was a bat]

§11.          The logibraic characteristics of  valid syllogisms
             A syllogism or sorities is an argument that has as many  terms as it has sentences.  Standard syllogisms have three terms and three sentences.  A1 and A2 are examples:

A1 
           every dolphin  is a mammal.                     -D+M
           every mammal  is warm-blooded             -M+W 
        (every dolphin is warm-blooded            -D+W
A2
               not a creature was stirring                       -(+C+S)
               some of the  creatures were giants            +C+G
          so  some giants weren’t stirring                  +G-S        

        Both syllogisms are valid.  In each the conclusion is equal to the sum of the premises. But equality is not in itself sufficient to guarantee the validity of a syllogistism or a sorites.  A1 and A2 also  satisfy  the  “Mood”  condition that a valid syllogistic argument must satisfy.    
      Only two moods are valid:
 (1) Syllogisms like A1,  that have only universal sentences.   Call such syllogisms “U-regular.” 
  (2) Syllogims like A2, that have a particular conclusion and a single particular premise.  Call such syllogisms “P-regular.”   All other moods are ‘irregular’ and invalid.   
        Syllogisms that  have more than one particular premise, are irregular and invalid.  For example,  A3 is invalid.   
                                         
                                                     A3
(1)  Some A is B             +A+B                 [e.g.,  some apes are black]
(2)  Some C isn’t B         +C-B                 [e.g.,some cats aren’t black]
           (3)   Some A is C               +A+C                         some ape are cats 

     A3’s premises add up to its conclusion but its mood is irregular so it is invalid.            
               The following principle, called the   “The REGAL  Principle,” states the  two necessary  and sufficient conditions  that  any  valid syllogistic argument must satisfy. 
                              THE REGAL PRINCIPLE:
A syllogism  or sorites is valid if and only if 
(1) the sum of its premises is equal to its conclusion,  and 
(2) its mood is U-regular or P-regular.
 
           In the 19th century, when logic was still “natural language,” it  attracted a large an intelligent  lay public.  Syllogistic was taught in the secondary schools and most educated people knew a lot about them.  Writers like Lewis Carroll made up many droll logical problems for the general public to solve.  (His books on logic are still in print and are still selling well.)   In solving them, I use  the  +/- calculus.  We are given premises and  asked to draw  a conclusion. 
   (1) all puddings are nice                     -P+N
   (2) some deserts are puddings          +D+P
   (3) no nice things are wholesome     -(N+W)
(4)   ?   ?   ?

           Here we see a particular statement among the premises so we know that the conclusion must be a particular statement. We also  know that a conclusion may be drawn by adding up the premises and canceling the middle terms. 

Adding up we have -P+N+D+P-N-W = -W+D or +D-W.  

Of the two algebraic alternatives for a conclusion, only the second will give us a syllogism that is valid in mood.  For we need a particular conclusion.  So our answer to Lewis Carroll's problem is 

/(4)     +D-W:    some deserts aren't wholesome

The next Carroll example has six premises.  But the same methods apply: 

(1) Everything not absolutely ugly , may be kept in a drawing-room.
(2) Nothing that is encrusted with salt is ever quite dry.
(3) Nothing should be kept in a drawing room unless it is free from damp.
(4)Bathing-machines are always kept near the sea.
(5) Nothing that is made of mother-of-pearl can be absolutely ugly.
(6) Whatever is kept near the sea gets encrusted with salt.  










All six premises are universal.  So the conclusion must be universal.  Adding up the premises we get -B-M  or -(B+M) which is the transcription of 

7. No bathing machine is made of mother of pearl.
      Quine accepts the “Procrustean bed  of predicate logic” because it “facilitates logical  inference.”  How facile is an MPL derivation of ‘x(Bx&Mx)’  from the six premises of  this sorites?
     
  §12.      How the Dictum de Omni  facilitates Relational Arguments                                                                   
        The D.O. sanctions the +/- application to relational reasoning.  Take  de Morgan’s ‘Tail of a Horse’ inference:
      () Every horse is an animal, so every tail of a horse is a tail of an animal. 
Applying the D.O., we may prove ()  valid by an indirect argument showing that affirming its premise but denying its conclusion entails a self-contradiction. For suppose  it’s true of every horse that  it is an animal but  also true of some horse that  its tail isn’t  a tail of an animal.  Since by the first premise, ‘is an animal’ is true of every horse, it must, by the D.O.,  also be  true of whatever  is a horse.   So, given the second premise,  it would be true of  a horse whose tail is not a tail of an animal that  it is an animal  whose tail is not a tail of an animal. This  self-contradictory  consequence of applying the D.O. comes out clearly if we logibraically add the premise of  () to the denial of its conclusion.  For by applying the D.O. we cancel  the middle term, ‘horse’ and arrive at a blatant absurdity of form ‘some X is not an X’, viz.,    that some tail of an animal is not a tail of an animal.
 (1)      –H+A:               Every horse is an animal;                                      Is an animal’ is 
                                                                                                                        true of every horse.
+(2) +(t+H) – (t+A);    Some tail of a horse isn’t a tail of an animal;       It’s true of  some                               
                                                                                                                         thing that is a horse   
                                                                                                                         that its tail is not  a 
                                                                                                                         tail of an animal.
   (3) +(t+A) - (t+ A);  Some tail of an animal horse isn’t a tail of an animal;  So, it’s true of some
                                                                                                             animal  that its tail is
                                                                                                             not a tail of an animal.                              
                                                                        
         This indirect reductio reasoning, which validates all arguments of form  ‘Every X is Y, so every R to an X is R to a Y, is an example of how an Aristotelian term logic of natural language expeditiously accounts for  inference involving multiply general propositions.
      Aristotelian Term Logic (ATL) is the classical  logic of natural language, the variable free ‘language of thought’ that we routinely use  in everyday deductive reasoning.  By contrast modern predicate logic (MPL) is a rational reconstruction of actual reasoning that uses a  symbolic language of quantifiers and bound variables, that is not  the language of actual ratiocination. 

Contrast what a practitioner of MPL must go through to show that 

 (3) Every- boy envies some+ owner of a+ canine follows from 

(1) Every- dog is+ a canine  and  (2) Every- boy envies some+ owner of a+ dog

He must find a way to derive  
                      (3*) x(Boyx ⊃ y(Enviesxy & z(Caninez & Ownsyz)))
 from the premises,
(1*) x(Dogx ⊃ Caninex)  and  (2*) x(Boyx ⊃ y(Enviesxy & z(Dogz&dOwnsyz))),
By contrast any teenager,  can apply the D.O. and instantly derive (3) from (1) and (2): 
 
  (1) Every- dog is+ a canine;                                                                            -D3+C3
  (2) Every- boy envies some+ owner of a+ dog;    and+    -B1+E12 +(O23 + D3)
(3 Every- boy envies some+ owner of a+ canine              -B1+E​12 +(O23+ C3). 


         How we might ss show that we intuitively reason logibraically
§13   That we  normally reason by taking advantage of the +/- character of the natural formatives,  needs to be empirically demonstrated.    If we could  show that we reason logibraically, that would explain our ability to reason as rapidly as we do. 
I  am not a cognitive psychologist.  But I have  a  suggestion about one possible way we might experimentally support the hypothesis that +/- reasoning is actually transpiring in everyday mental reasoning. 
            Even microsecond differences in speed of reasoning are now experimentally discernible.  
 Consider the  two valid inferences:
1. No noncitizens are voters  ∴ all voters are citizens →  -((-C)+V) ∴-V+C
2. Only citizens are voters     ∴ all voters are citizens         ……….   ∴-V+C
         To   reckon (2) logibraically valid, we  must first  normalize ‘only citizens are voters,’  by paraphrasing it  as ‘no non-citizens are voters:’  (2) may then be algebraically transcribed and reckoned in the manner of (1).   Since normalizing (2) requires an extra step, one who reasons logibraically will find that reckoning (2) takes slightly more time than reckoning (1).   That finding  would count in favor of the  hypothesis that +/- reckoning is the default way we reason deductively. 
      Quite generally, if we reason logibraically, then whenever we find two valid inferences that have the same conclusion but whose premises differ only in that one is already in “logibraically normal form” while the other needs to be paraphrased into normal form,  we should expect the one needing normalization to take more reckoning time than the first.   If we don’t reason logibraically, there is no reason to expect a  difference  in  speed of inference 
       We may, for example, find that people take less time  to infer ‘No Saint is unkind  [ -(S+(-K))]’  from ‘Every saint is kind [-S+K]’ than from ‘Saints are always kind, ’ which is not in normal +/- categorical form. That would suggest that the  direct +/- route is the default way we actually reason.   More generally, it would support the view that   people routinely transform  much of  what they hear and read into   ‘plus/minus normal  form’  for efficient logibraic reckoning. 
       Cognitive psychology should be able to test  the +/- hypothesis by comparing the speed  of  reasoning with sentences that are in logibraic normal form   to the speed of reasoning with sentences whose natural constants cannot be directly transcribed logibraically. 
Frege and Aristotle
 §14.     Frege had an ingenious idea of how we could be reasoning. Though he believed that we could and should be reasoning the quantifier- bound-variable way, he probably knew better than to claim outright that we actually  reason that way.  There is no good argument for the view that we are actually  reasoning the QV or should be  reasoning the QV way.    It’s  true that natural language lacks  the quantifier-binding mechanisms of  modern predicate logic but false that this renders   it deductively weaker than MPL as a vehicle for reasoning, . ​[18]​
Because Aristotle’s Physics has no place in a scientific Physics Department; Newton’s  physics has  legitimately and irrevocably  supplanted Aristotle’s Physics.  By contrast,  Aristotle’s term  logic  is not  unscientific and its almost universal replacement by predicate logic as the new logic of the schools is not  sanctioned by “austere science.”.  Pace  Quine,  reasoning  with the quantifiers and bound variables of predicate logic is in no way more scientific  than reasoning logibraically  with the formatives of ‘ordinary language.’ Quite the contrary: reasoning the +/-  way is simpler,  faster,  as well as more natural (non-Procrustean) than reasoning the QV way..        
§15.    Logical theory and the teaching of logic now  face a future that will increasingly be shaped  by  the empirical  findings of cognitive science of how we actually reason mentally  Once cognitive psychologists become  aware of the formal, +/-, powers of the logical constants  of natural language, they  will look for  and find ways to empirically test the hypothesis that we  reason  intuitively, by unconsciously exploiting  the   +/- character of the natural logical constants. They will then be in a position to confirm or disconfirm the +/- hypothesis.   I, of course,  believe it will be confirmed.  
            The hypothesis that we normally  reason  by  instinctively reckoning with the +/- character  of the logical particles of natural language, will, I believe, be found  to be the  ‘best explanation’ of our naturally fluent rationality, confirming  the view of ‘ratiocination’ that Thomas Hobbes had  peremptorily announced four hundred years ago.                  
That finding  should  spark a successful  back-to-Aristotle counter-revolution  that will set aside the way logic has been taught for the last hundred years. The logic of natural language will again be standard logic. Quantifiers and bound variables will be things of the past.  But this time around, teachers of logic and reasoning will  be like teachers of ballet or tennis coaches who know what sinews and tendons are engaged in the movements of ballet or tennis,  and  who train their subjects  to get the best out of their natural abilities by deliberately focusing on  doing artfully what they unconsciously  do artlessly.   
         The goal of logic teachers will be similarly modest:  to improve the students’ natural ability to reason by ‘doing what  comes naturally.’  They will first inform the students that they already  reason quite well by instinctively exploiting the +/-  character  of  the  logical words and particles of  the natural language  in which they  think and reason.  They will  then show them how the logibraic method applies  to a variety of  arguments,  and assign ‘exercises’  that literally provide exercises in natural reasoning.  In my experience,  students  become more adept, versatile and stronger reasoners by doing knowingly and consciously what they naturally do unknowingly and unconsciously.                                                  
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